长期以来，埃及在第三次中东战争前的举动令人困惑，在战争中的拙劣表现也让人吃惊。既有的解释大多将纳赛尔军人政权视为内部统一的行为体，既淡化埃及军队与政府之间的分歧，又忽视总司令阿明与总统纳赛尔的权力斗争。进入20世纪60年代，代表政府的纳赛尔和代表军队的阿明之间矛盾日益加深，军政双方在政权构成问题、军队团体议题和国家安全事务方面分歧愈发明显。阿明为了加强对军队的控制和巩固个人权力，在战前有选择地向纳赛尔传递信息，有意忽视与政府的战略协调，同时拒绝执行政府的某些决定，促使以色列发动“六五战争”。军政分歧也导致一些低能力的军官充斥军中，军队对战争准备不足，战争中进退失据，降低了军队的战斗力并致使埃军大败。
For a long time，people feel puzzled on Egyptian actions before the third Middle East war and their poor performance in the war. Most of the existing explanations hold the military regime of Nasser as an internal unity，they play down the differences between the military and government in Egypt，and ignore a power struggle between President Nasser and Commander in Chief Amin. Since 1961，there has been deep dissatisfaction between Nasser and Amin，those tensions and disagreements manifested in three areas：military regime，corporate issues and security strategy. In order to strengthen the control on the army and personal power，Amin selectively delivers information to Nasser，deliberately ignores strategic coordination with the government，refuses to implement certain decisions made by Nasser，these provokes Israel to launch a war. Civil-military division caused some army officers with low competitiveness，ill-prepareness for war，and poor performance in the war，reducing the military effectiveness and leading to the catastrophic defeat.
