罗伯特·普特南（Robert Putnam）的双层博弈理论认为，谈判者在国际层面和国内层面的作为均对国际谈判的结果产生影响。本文借鉴双层博弈理论对波兰与欧盟的农业谈判进行分析，认为谈判结果是双方在国际层面和波兰国内及欧盟内部层面的行为共同作用的产物。在国际层面，波兰谈判代表利用欧盟老成员国的待遇和国内政府危机向欧盟施压，迫使欧盟做出让步，欧盟则使用威胁策略，并利用波兰天主教会扩大波兰的“获胜集合”，以满足欧盟的谈判要求。在国内或欧盟内部层面，来自波兰农民、政党和利益集团的压力促使波兰谈判代表形成强硬的谈判立场，欧盟则出于欧盟预算和成员国在农业谈判方面分歧的考虑，没有满足波兰的全部要求。
Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory suggests that the actions of negotiators at both the international and domestic levels have an impact on the outcome of international negotiations. This paper draws on the two-level game theory to analyze the agricultural negotiations between Poland and the EU. At the international level，Polish negotiators used the identity of an old EU member and the domestic government crisis to pressure the EU to make concessions，while the EU used threatening tactics and the Polish Catholic Church to expand Poland’s “win-set” in order to meet the EU’s negotiating demands. At the domestic or intra-EU level，pressure from Polish farmers，political parties and interest groups pushed Polish negotiators to develop a strong negotiating position，while the EU did not meet all of Poland’s demands on account of the EU budget and differences among member states in the agricultural negotiations.
