This paper deals with tracing the Chinese unprecedented economic and political presence in the eastern periphery of the European Union through the sub-regional cooperation format “17+1”. This multilateral platform is territorially comprised by Central European Visegrad Four (V4), namely Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic; Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), and Balkans (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania), and since 2019 also Greece. Historically, these countries belonged to the European, Russian, Turkish and US sphere of interest and influence, while China is (except of post WW2 period until 1980s) a brand new and non-traditional actor there. When the new sub-regional group of “16+1” was established in 2012, its broader context with the Chinese go-out strategy and similarities with other China designed regional formats in Africa ( The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC), and Latin America (China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum CELAC), raised concern in the EU as the most of the 16 member states have been already included in the EU-China strategic partnership.The format of “16+1” was in academic writings broadly explained as the infrastructure, transportation and energy sector focused international cooperative scheme, which is linked with the Chinese investment boom after 2010 and the PRC’s financial incentives. Consequently, after the 2013 President Xi Jinping’s official announcement of the global project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) raised the international attention as a game changing global impetus that might speed up the geopolitical shift from West towards the economic and military power rising China, which increased its diplomatically activities through bilateral, and even more than before, by multilateral strategies. Such the new challenge to the US dominated Western liberal order is perceived as a set of new concerns that deal with spreading the Chinese influence into Europe and European regions, undermining the transatlantic goals and rising economic and technological competition up to so far unprecedented level.This paper summarizes the author’s existing research works on CEE-China relations after 2010, provides new updates on “16+1” agenda as it is perceived by CEE academia. The added content above the author’ s already existing research is a changing nature of EU-China strategic partnership after 2016 when a more assertive approach of the EU, as well as the German and French leadership, was adopted, as the big European states and Brussels call for more balanced economic agenda and investment screening systems. The perception of the PRC is in the EU being shifted from strategic partnership more towards the strategic competition. Finally, this paper introduces the new theme of the US growing diplomatic efforts to confront the Chinese influence in Central Europe.